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I. INTRODUCTION

Few scholars have explored the Supreme Court's role in creating private
law, a surprising oversight given that private law often affects the lives of
individuals as much as public law. This article focuses on one area of private
law: federal bankruptcy law. The Court is the Bankruptcy Code's final
arbiter. In addition to the social benefits and costs of the federal bankruptcy
system, vast amounts of financial wealth depend on the Court's bankruptcy
decisions.
In recent years, political scientists have paid increasing attention to the
role of agendas in political processes. She who sets the agenda often controls
the outcome of the political process. The Supreme Court sets its agenda
through the certiorari process. Using the tools of statistical analysis, this
article explores how the Court sets the agenda for its bankruptcy law
decisions. The article presents a great deal of information about when and
why the Court grants certiorari in a bankruptcy case. The results should be
of interest to anyone concerned about the Court's role as an expositor of
bankruptcy law.
This article analyzes data from every certiorari petition involving either
a bankruptcy case or an issue of bankruptcy law since the Bankruptcy Code's
1978 enactment.' The article first provides an important analysis of the
Court's institutional role as an expositor of bankruptcy law. At the same time,
the accompanying analysis of over 600 certiorari petitions proves interesting
reading for persons interested in the certiorari process generally. The article's
approach differs in several important respects from other studies of certiorari.
First, by including petitions from an extended period of time, this article
avoids making only a static evaluation of the Court's certiorari decisions2 in
favor of an analysis accounting for the changing membership and philosophy
of the Court over time An analysis of both certiorari grants and denials is

1. This article evaluates data from post-1978 bankruptcy cases arising under the
Bankruptcy Code, not considering post-1978 bankruptcy petitions to the Court arising
under the old Bankruptcy Act. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
2. Many empirical studies of certiorari grants and denials have had a scope limited
to a single Supreme Court term. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A
ManagerialTheory of the Supreme Court'sResponsibilities: An EmpiricalStudy, 59
N.Y.U. L. REv. 681, 778 (1984) (analyzing 1,860 petitions and jurisdictional
statements denied review during the 1982 Term); Todd J. Tiberi, Comment,
Supreme Court Denials of Certiorari in Conflicts Cases: Percolation or
Procrastination?,54 U. PITT. L. REV. 861, 870, 878 (1993) (evaluating 63 grants
of certiorari from the 1988 Term).
3. See Book Note, The UncertaintyofCert, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1795, 1798 (1992)

(addressing the need for analytical longevity in studying the Court's case-selection
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/10
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also unique among existing empirical studies and provides a comparative basis
of study.4 Using 1978 as a beginning point for evaluation of bankruptcy
petitions also produces a large total number of certiorari petitions for empirical
analysis.5 Finally, this article has a unique and focused approach involving
a detailed look at a particular area of the law, allowing a more specific
appraisal of the importance of substantive subject matter to the Court's
certiorari decisions. 6
Part II of this article details the various arguments and hypotheses that
have emerged from the scholarship about Supreme Court certiorari. Here, we
look at both the scholarly arguments regarding the case-selection criteria the
Court should evaluate as well as empirical findings regarding the criteria the
Court does, in fact, evaluate. The purpose is not to provide another
exhaustive review of certiorari theory and practice. Rather, we explain how
previous academic literature motivates and justifies the variables we examine.
Part III explains our method of data compilation as well as the method we
used to define and categorize our database. We discuss the results of our
statistical analysis in Part IV, first detailing the increasingly prevalent position
of bankruptcy petitions in the federal court system and on the Court's

process).
4. Most studies in the field have focused only on one side of the decision making
equation. See, e.g., Estreicher & Sexton, supranote 2, at 778 (evaluating cert denials);
Arthur D. Hellman, By PrecedentUnbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved
IntercircuitConflicts, 56 U. Prrr. L. REV. 693, 705-06 (1995) (analyzing denials in
two groups of cases from the 1988-90 terms); Tiberi, supranote 2, at 861, 870, 878
(evaluating only grants of certiorari).
5. Of the few previous studies specifically targeting bankruptcy cert petitions to
the Court, none have evaluated a relatively large sample of petitions. See, e.g., Charles
J. Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, OfCommas, Gerunds& Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy
Jurisprudenceof the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 823, 888-90 (1991)
(discussing the Court's decision to grant certiorari in less than 30 cases) [hereinafter
Tabb & Lawless, Rehnquist Court]; Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and
Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court'sBankruptcy Cases,71 WAsH. U. L.Q.
535, 552-53 (1993) (analyzing the Court's decisions in 24 bankruptcy cases granted
certiorari).
6. The large body of literature regarding the Court's case-selection process tends
to focus on subject matter-neutral considerations of the Court, such as the presence of
intercircuit conflicts and whether the issue in a particular petition has sufficiently
"percolated" among the lower courts. See, e.g., Stewart A. Baker, A PracticalGuide
to Certiorari,33CATH. U. L. REv. 611, 618-20 (1984) (discussing the importance of
these considerations to the Court). As well as primarily focusing on these
considerations, the empirical studies in this area have tended to favor subject matterneutral petition samples. See, e.g., Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 2, at 778-80
(analyzing the intercircuit conflicts in all petitions denied certiorari in the 1982 Term).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 10

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

certiorari docket. Part IV also explores the determinants of bankruptcy
certiorari, using a regression analysis. Part V summarizes our conclusions.
II. THE CERTIORARI DECISION

A. IntercircuitConflicts
Many commentators have focused their attention on the presence of a
conflict between the decision underlying a certiorari petition and other lower
court decisions.7 Most discussion analyzes conflicts between decisions of the
United States courts of appeals rather than other lower courts (such as state
courts).' Perhaps one reason for this prevalent theme is the Court's own Rule
10 that emphasizes intercircuit conflicts as a consideration for whether
certiorari will be granted.9 Most important, however, is the Court itself
simply taking more cases involving intercircuit conflicts, which tend to raise

7. See, e.g., Floyd Feeney, Conflicts Involving FederalLaw: A Review of Cases
Presented to the Supreme Court, in Commission on Revision of Federal Court
Appellate Jurisdiction,67 F.R.D. 195, 221 (1975) (analyzing "the extent to which the
Supreme Court is denying review despite the existence of a conflict"); Sanford
Levinson, Strategy, Jurisprudence,and Certiorari,79 VA. L. REV. 717, 726 (1993)
(proposing that a split of authority among federal circuit courts does not guarantee
certworthiness); Daniel J. Meador, A Comment on the ChiefJustice'sProposals,69
A.B.A. J. 448, 449 (1983) (discussing the Court's failure to resolve as many lowercourt conflicts as it would like due to case "overload"); see also WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, THE SUPREmE COURT: How IT WAs, How IT Is 265 (1987) ("One factor
that plays a large part with every member of the Court is whether the case sought to
be reviewed has been decided differently from a very similar case coming from
another lower court...").
8. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need For a New
National Court, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1400, 1407-08 (1987) (discussing different
approaches to evaluating the importance of an intercircuit conflict); Arthur D. Hellman,
CaseSelection in the Burger Court: A PreliminaryInquiry,60 NOTRE DAMi L. REV.
947, 1014 (1985) (proposing that the most "firmly established"justification for a grant
of certiorari is the presence of an intercircuit conflict); Walter V. Schaefer, Reducing
Circuit Conflicts, 69 A.B.A. J. 452, 454 (1983) (criticizing the Court for not
immediately resolving many intercircuit conflicts).
9. Sup. CT. R. 10(a) states that the Court, in exercising its certiorari discretion,
will take into account that "a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in
conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same
important matter." However, the presence of other types of lower court conflicts
should also warrant the Court's consideration under Rule 10.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/10
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issues of uniformity in federal law, than conflicts involving state courts of last
resort 1 °
Nearly all scholarly discussion of intercircuit conflicts rest on the concept
of "percolation."1 This concept entails the supposed desire of the Court to
allow intercircuit conflicts to "percolate" among the federal circuit courts
before the Court resolves them. 2 Thus, the argument goes, if the issue
presented in a certiorari petition does not involve an intercircuit conflict, or
if a conflict exists but only a few circuits have addressed the issue, then the
Court will deny certiorari so that percolation can occur.13
Scholarly
treatments of percolation tend to reduce the Court's certiorari decision making
process to a simple utilitarian analysis, under which the Court is said to weigh
the benefits of percolation with the costs of the resulting nonuniformity in the

law. 4 An intercircuit conflict is "intolerable" to the Court, when the costs
of percolation outweigh its benefits."

The following sections address the

10. See ROBERT L. STERN T AL., SuPREmE COURT PRACTICE § 4.4, at 168 (7th
ed. 1993) ("One of the prime purposes of the certiorari jurisdiction is to bring about
uniformity of decisions on [matters of federal and general law] among the federal
courts of appeals.").
11. See, e.g., Michael F. Sturley, Observationson the Supreme Court's Certiorari
Jurisdictionin IntercircuitConflict Cases,67 TEX. L. REV. 125, 1268 (1989) (noting
the practice of the Court to let an issue percolate among the lower courts before
resolving the issue); see also Hellman, supra note 4, at 700.
12. See Estreicher & Sexton, supranote 2, at 716 (defining "percolation" as "the
independent evaluation of a legal issue by different courts").
13. See Michael S. Shenberg, Note, Identification,Tolerability, andResolution of
IntercircuitConflicts: Reexamining ProfessorFeeney's Study of Conflicts in Federal
Law, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1007, 1027 (1984) (detailing the benefits of allowing
percolation of an issue that only two federal circuit courts have addressed).
14. See, e.g., J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature andExtent ofIntercircuitConflicts:
A Solution Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 913, 930-31
(1983). Wallace actually devises a mathematical formula for the Court to employ in
evaluating certiorari petitions: "V = Q - (D + U). The value of intercircuit conflict
(V) equals the improvement in quality of the resulting rule (Q) less the sum of the cost
of the delay in producing a definitive answer (D) and the cost of the resultant
uncertainty." Id at 930; see also Sanford Caust-Ellenbogen, Note, Using Choice of
Law Rules to Make IntercircuitConflictsTolerable, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1078, 1080-83
(1984) (using the costs-benefits formula as the method of analysis); Tiberi, supranote
2, at 864 (arguing that advocates of the percolation concept find the policies behind
the benefits of percolation always outweigh the costs). But see Paul M. Bator, What
Is Wrong With the Supreme Court?, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673, 691 (arguing the costs
side of the equation will nearly always outweigh the benefits side).
15. See Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 2, at 699, 725 (describing this costsbenefits analysis as essentially a measure of the intolerability of an intercircuit
conflict).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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various costs and benefits that could, or should, play a role in the Court's
evaluation of an intercircuit conflict.
1. Benefits of Percolation
The Court may perceive several general benefits of letting an issue
percolate among the lower federal courts. First, the issue may resolve itself
as more circuits address it, precluding the need for the Court to address the
issue.' 6 Second, even if the Court expects an issue to remain unresolved,
percolation can provide the Court with a wealth of well-reasoned lower-court
perspectives addressing the issue in the event the Court later tackles it.'
Proponents of percolation argue that this process leads to better Supreme
Court opinions.' 8 Further, the circuits in the process act as "laboratories" for
the conflicting rules, with the Court waiting at the end of the process to judge
the experiment's results. 9
Some commentators have questioned whether percolation actually
provides any benefits to the Supreme Court. Regarding the notion of betterreasoned Supreme Court opinions, some have pointed to the lack of an
empirical basis for this conclusion. 0 One empirical study, focusing on the
Court's voting margins in percolated and nonpercolated cases granted

16. See STERN ET AL., supra note 10, § 4.4, at 169.
17. See McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961,963 (1983) (stating the Court should
deny certiorari when an issue needs more "study" in the courts below); Baker &
McFarland, supranote 8, at 1408 (noting that one alleged justification for percolation
is "allowing an issue to 'simmer' while several judges and different courts approximate
different solutions [to] provide guidance to the Supreme Court when it ultimately
decides to resolve the conflict").; Estreicher & Sexton, supranote 2, at 716.
18. See Tiberi, supra note 2, at 864. In explaining this argument, Tiberi states:
"The more attorneys who have briefed and argued the issue, and the more judges who
[W]eaker
decided it, the better will be the decision from the Supreme Court ....
arguments are weeded out." Id
19. See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 14, at 929 (arguing the circuits "act as the
'laboratories' of new or refined legal principles, providing the Supreme Court with a
wide array of approaches to legal issues and thus, hopefully, with the raw material
from which to fashion better judgments."); see also Gilliard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S.
867 (1983) (stating the Court denied certiorari in this case so that more state supreme
courts and federal circuits could "[experiment] with substantive and procedural
solutions to the problem"); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1979).
20. See, e.g., Bator, supranote 14, at 690 (pointing out the lack of evidence that
the Court consistently relies upon the lower-court opinions underlying a conflict);
Shaefer, supra note 8, at 454 ("[T]he notion of the Supreme Court's monitoring the
results of experiments in more than 100 conflicting interpretations each year strains
credulity.").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/10
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certiorari, concluded the Court reaches less-unanimous decisions when
reviewing percolated issues.'
Other commentators have questioned the
appropriateness of viewing the federal circuits (as opposed to the state courts)
as "laboratories" for the law.'
2. Presence of Potential Benefits in Particular Cases
Although the Court may perceive general benefits from percolation, there
still remains the question of which cases would most benefit from further
percolation. The first such characteristic that may justify further percolation
is the number of circuit courts that have differed on the issue presented in a
certiorari petition. Or, stated differently, how many lower courts does it take
to "percolate" an issue? "Three" is a common answer. A third decision
addressing the issue in conflict, assuming agreement with one of the two
original decisions, would make the rule stated in that opinion a "majority" rule
among the circuits. Other circuits may be more likely to follow the trend so
established. As well, the third decision may develop a hybrid approach,
combining the rules from both earlier decisions into one, more-persuasive rule
that other circuits are more likely to adopt.'
Commentators have differed over the effect of another characteristic of
intercircuit conflicts-timespan between the conflicting decisions. On one
hand, if the decision underlying the certiorari petition conflicts with one or
more older cases, the Court may perceive a need to let the circuit(s) that
rendered the older decision reevaluate its holding, taking into considerationthe

21. Tiberi, supra note 2, at 879-80. For purposes of the study, Tiberi defined
"percolated cases" as ones in which either the Court's opinion or the lower-court
opinion recognized an intercircuit conflict. Tiberi, supra note 2, at 875. The study
also recognized "degrees of percolation" based upon the number of circuits in conflict
and the age of the first decision involved in the conflict. Tiberi, supranote 2, at 87678.
22. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, Siskel and Ebertat the Supreme Court, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 1472, 1486 (1989). Baker argues that while states, through their right to
exercise general police power, may be appropriate "laboratories ofpolicy," the "circuits
are not appropriate laboratories .... Theirs is a false sovereignty, an autonomy of
happenstance and convenience." Id
23. Shenberg, supranote 13, at 1027. The concept of circuits as "laboratories"
may also be a basis for a two-court requirement. Shenberg argues that letting the
issue underlying a two-court conflict percolate can give the Court an opportunity
to "observe" the operation of the competing rules in their respective circuits.
Shenberg notes one possible exception to a two-court requirement would be the
event of the Court perceiving a low probability of a third court reaching the issue
in the future. Shenberg, supra note 13, at 1027.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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new "modem" rule. ' Further, until the circuit cites the older case with
approval, the Court may view the intervening years and resulting new case law
as evidence that the percolation process is achieving results.' On the other
hand, a long period of time between conflicting decisions could signal to the
Court that the percolation process has run its course, particularly in light of
any intervening decisions between the current and older ones.
A third characteristic of intercircuit conflicts that may bear on the Court's
percolation assessment is the substantive subject matter underlying the conflict.
Because the Court effectively has final review on constitutional matters, the
need for the Court to have the aid of a large body of lower-court
jurisprudence from a fully percolated issue may be the greatest with respect
to constitutional issues.26 On matters of administrative or procedural issues,
the Court also may allow extensive percolation. A conflict regarding
administrative rules may be difficult for the Court to resolve without first
having evidence of how well the competing administrative rules worked in the
lower courts.27 Similarly, the Court may want the circuits to serve as
laboratories for conflicting procedural rules, particularly where the intercircuit

24. Baker, supra note 6, at 618. Baker quantifies the necessary time frame as ten
to fifteen years. Baker, supranote 6, at 618; see also STERN ET AL., supra note 10,
§ 4.4, at 172 (arguing a 30-40 year time lapse, "without any indication that [the older
decision] has current vitality," will minimize the importance of an intercircuit conflict).
But see Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287, 289 (1967) (involving an 18-year old
conflicting opinion).
25. See Shenberg, supra note 13, at 1024-25 (discussing the need for a circuit
court to reaffirm the older decision before a "standoff' sufficient to warrant Supreme
Court attention exists); see also Hellman, supranote 4, at 734. An example occurred
in the bankruptcy case of CaliforniaState Board of Equalization v. SierraSummit,
Inc., 490 U.S. 844 (1989). In SierraSummit, the Ninth Circuit had ruled that a state
could not impose a sales tax on a bankruptcy trustee's liquidation sale. The Ninth
Circuit's ruling reaffirmed its own 3 1-year old precedent which stood in conflict with
every other circuit that had considered the issue. The Court granted certiorari and
reversed, bringing the Ninth Circuit into harmony with the rest of the federal courts.
For background about SierraSummit, see Tabb & Lawless, Rehnquist Court, supra
note 5, at 846-47.
26. Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the
Regional Design of the U.S. Court of Appeals, 56 U. CIii. L. REV. 603, 633 (1989)
("The Supreme Court's decision on the meaning of a constitutional provision is
difficult, if not virtually impossible, to change .... Thus, it is important that the
Supreme Court have the benefit of as much thinking on the question as is feasible
before it makes this final resolution."); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W.
Huber, The IntercircuitCommittee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1425 (1987); Tiberi,
supra note 2, at 870.
27. See Shenberg, Note, supra note 13, at 1031-32, cites as an example the
drafting of the most understandable jury instructions regarding damage awards.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/10
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conflict involves a matter of trial procedure having no reach beyond the
courtroom.28 However, procedural conflicts can implicate a different Rule
10 concern, calling for the immediate attention of the Court in its role as the
ultimate supervisor of federal judicial proceedings.29
3. The Costs of Percolation
Most empirical studies have focused on the importance of certain qualities
that make a certiorari petition a bad candidate for percolation. ° With the
disadvantages of nonuniformity of federal law as the touchstone, the general
proposition is that these "costs" of percolation can necessitate a grant of
certiorari even in cases where the percolation of an intercircuit conflict
Through this weighing process,
otherwise would be advantageous.31
commentators proffer, the Court identifies "intolerable" intercircuit conflicts
in need of immediate resolution. Although scholars have set forth many
factors that may contribute to the intolerability of an intercircuit conflict, the
most scrutiny has focused upon the risks of economic harm to multicircuit
actors and forum shopping if the Court does not immediately resolve a
conflict.
Regarding the risk of economic harm, persons and entities operating in
more than one circuit can suffer harm when they must plan their personal and

28. See Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 2, at 727; Harold Leventhal, A Modest
ProposalforaMulti-CircuitCourtofAppeals, 24 AM. U. L. REv. 881, 898-99 (1975);
Nancy Haas, Note, CriminalLaw 1I, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1243, 1256-60 (1984).
29. In addition to consideration of the presence of intercircuit conflicts in
evaluating certiorari petitions, Rule 10 provides the Court should place importance on
the fact that a "United States court of appeals ... has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course ofjudicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by
a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power." SUP. Cr.
R. 10.
See STERN ET AL., supranote 10, § 4.15, at 191-92 ("On the Supreme Court rests
the prime responsibility for the proper functioning of the federal judiciary."). In such
instances, the Court's role in the area of federal procedural error correction can
override the experimental benefits of percolation. STERN ET AL., supra note 10,
§ 4.15, at 191-92; see also Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 7 (1984) ("As the Court
of last resort in the federal system, we have supervisory authority and therefore must
occasionally perform a pure error-correction function in federal litigation.").
30. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 4, at 697 ("[Mjost of the conflicts that the
Supreme Court does hear either do not generate any of the consequences that might
make them 'intolerable' or do so only for a short period of time.").
31. See, e.g., Estreicher & Sexton, supranote 2, at 699 ("Mhe mere existence of
a conflict does not warrant Supreme Court intervention unless the costs created by the
conflict outweigh the beneficial effects of further percolation.").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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commercial activities under the differing rules of law in multiple circuits. An
economic cost accrues to the multicircuit actor because to avoid liability and
to maintain uniformity in its operations it must change its behavior and act in
accordance with the rules of law in the most restrictive circuit.3" The Court
may view this problem as intolerable because "the most restrictive court is
effectively binding the nation" with respect to nationwide actors, necessitating
either Court approval or invalidation of that circuit's rule. 3 In such
instances, percolation cannot effectively occur because only one rule, as
opposed to multiple competing rules, is governing the behavior of actors in all
circuits.
Closely related to effects on multicircuit behavior is the danger that
excessive forum shopping will result from an intercircuit conflict. If future
plaintiffs would have the ability to choose between courts in different circuits
as possible fora for their suits, 34 the Court may view a conflict regarding the
issue as intolerable because of the plaintiffs' ability to chose the most
favorable rule' Thus, the Court's evaluation would center on the applicable
venue statute and choice-of-law rules. Another consideration might be the
type of plaintiff likely to bring a claim invoking the issue. Corporations, for

32. Hellman, supra note 4, at 748-49. As examples of the most common
intercircuit actors, Hellman lists corporations, labor unions, and pension funds.
Hellman, supra note 4, at 748; see also Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The FederalCircuit:
A Case Study in SpecializedCourts,64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989); Shenberg, supra

note 13, at 1021 ("[Multicircuit actors] are forced to plan their behavior according to
the law of the forum that has adopted the legal standard most detrimental to their
interests."). An example of a multicircuit actor in bankruptcy court occurred in
Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1493 (1995). In that case, chapter 11 debtor
Celotex Corp. was subject to different judicial orders in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. For background on the
Celotex case, see Robert M. Lawless, LegisprudenceThrough a BankruptcyLens: A
Study in the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 47 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1, 77-81
(1996) [hereinafter Lawless, Bankruptcy Legisprudence].

33. Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 14, at 1082, 1084 ("Mhe most restrictive rule
effectively binds the nation and thereby cuts off percolation."); Estreicher & Sexton,
supranote 2, at 725 (arguing that such a wide-reaching single-circuit rule will gamer
the Court's attention because it "upsets the balance among the lower courts").
34. See Hellman, supranote 4, at 754 (noting that while litigants in general often
have a choice between fora, "many federal claims can be brought only in a single
district"); see also Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and
ForumShopping in the BankruptcyReorganizationofLarge, PubliclyHeldCompanies,

1991 WIS. L. RV. 11 (analyzing the ability of bankrupt debtors to forum shop).
35. See Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 2, at 725 (arguing the Court will view
"the cost to the legal system of compelling disregard of the holding of a court [as] too
high to bear").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/10
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example, are likely
to be in a better financial position to pursue a claim in a
6
distant forum.
Another factor that may weigh on the Court's assessment is the existence
of a published lower-court opinion identifying the circuit conflict. If the
decision creating the conflict is unpublished, multicircuit actors and their
attorneys are less likely to be cognizant of the split in authority or to afford
it a great deal of weight once they recognize its existence. 7 In compiling
our database, we noted the presence or absence of a published circuit court
opinion for each certiorari petition, allowing empirical evaluation of this
factor.

B. The United States Government As a Party
When the United States government is a party to a certiorari petition,
conventional wisdom says the likelihood of a certiorari grant substantially
increases. Our own data and the data from others support this proposition, as
about one-third of the Court's certiorari grants each term involve cases in
which the federal government either is a party or has filed an amicus brief.8
In general, commentators have traced this preference to the inherent presence
of a government interest in any petition to which the federal government is a
party. Some argue the Court often grants certiorari in response to still another
self-perceived role, this one as the ultimate decider of conflicts involving
issues of federal government administration. 9 Beyond conflict resolution,
others have asserted the Court tries to take an active role in furthering the
government interests present in certiorari petitions.4
However, other

36. See Todd E. Thompson, IncreasingUniformity and Capacity in the Federal
Appellate System, 11 HASTiNGS CONST. L.Q. 457,468-69 (1984) (discussingthe ability
of certain types of plaintiffs to chose the forum in which to locate based upon the
applicable laws).
37. See Hellman, supranote 4, at 709 ("The more explicit the acknowledgement
of conflict, the more likely it is that people will adjust their behavior to take it into
account."); David 0. Stewart, The Uncertaintyof Cert, 82 A.B.A. J. 50, 51 (1996)
(arguing that the lack of a written opinion from the court below is "fatal" to a
petition's chances of receiving a grant of certiorari).
38. Bator, supra note 14, at 680-81.
39. See, e.g., William Alsup & Tracy L. Salisbury, A Comment on ChiefJustice
Burger's Proposalfor a Temporary Panel to Resolve Intercircuit Conflicts, 11
HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 359, 368 (1984) ("[Ihe Supreme Court is quick to grant

certiorari in cases presenting conflicts that could affect the administration of the
national government and the administration of the armed services.. ").
40. See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 562-63 (listing "sovereign immunity,
federalism, and the need for access to the Court" as government interests important to
the Court). In Rasmussen's sample of 24 bankruptcy cases granted certiorari, 19
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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commentators have pointed towards more specific explanations, largely
dependent on the federal government's position as petitioner or respondent.
1. The United States as Petitioner
About three-fourths of the certiorari petitions the federal government files
receive a certiorari grant,4 compared with a success rate of only around six
percent for other parties. This high success rate is attributable to the work of
the Solicitor General.42 Except in rare instances, the Solicitor General retains
absolute discretion to decide which federal government cases are worthy of
petition to the Supreme Court from amongst those cases that lost at the circuit
court level.43
Commentators cite two reasons for the Solicitor General's significant
success. First, the Solicitor General has a careful screening process for cases
that the federal government has lost and exercises a large degree of restraint
in choosing which cases the pursue further. Of the average six hundred cases
the United States loses each year at the appellate level, the Office only
chooses forty to fifty as necessitating a certiorari petition." Because of this
policy of restraint, the Solicitor General's petitioning decisions receive a large
degree of deference from the Court. 45

presented intercircuit conflicts, while the other three cases involved a government
petitioner. Rasmussen, supranote 5, at 562. Rasmussen concluded: "[W]hile private
parties must wait for a circuit split to have the Supreme Court review an issue
involving the interpretation of bankruptcy law, the government has ready access to the
Court when its feels aggrieved by an appellate court decision." Rasmussen,supranote
5, at 562-63.
41. Eric Schnapper, Becketat the Bar-The Conflicting Obligations ofthe Solicitor
General, 21 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1210-11 (1988); STERN ET AL., supra note 10, § 4.1,
at 164 (stating about 70 percent of federal government petitions received grants from
1985 through 1991).
42. The Office files around forty petitions on behalf of the federal government

each Supreme Court term, usually receiving more than thirty grants of certiorari.
Schnapper, supra note 41, at 1212. In addition, the Office, often at the request of the
Court, files between five and ten amicus briefs supporting other petitions each year.
Schnapper, supra note 41, at 1212. The Court grants certiorari to a majority of these
petitions. Schnapper, supra note 41, at 1212.
43. Baker, supranote 6, at 622-23; see also Roy W. McLeese, Note, Disagreement
in D.C.: The Relationship Between the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit and its
Implicationsfor a National Court ofAppeals, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1048, 1071 (1984);
Note, Government Litigation in the Supreme Court: The Roles of the Solicitor
General, 78 YALE L.J. 1442, 1453-57 (1969).
44. Baker, supra note 6, at 623.
45. Schnapper, supra note 41, at 1215; see also Estreicher & Sexton, supra note
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/10
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Second, in making its petitioning decisions, the Office attempts to apply
the same criteria that the Court applies to its certiorari determinations. Unlike
attorneys in private cases, the Solicitor General's exercise of discretion is not
subject to the demands of private clients and has as a basis a high level of
expertise in defining "certworthiness. 46 The resulting deference from the
Court can lead to certiorari grants even in the absence of intercircuit
conflict.47
2. The United States as Respondent
Many commentators also point out the greater likelihood of the Court
granting certiorari when the federal government is a respondent as opposed to
the instance of a petition involving only private parties.48 One possible
explanation for the disparity is the inherent presence of an issue of public
importance in most cases in which in the federal government is a party. Such
issues get the Court's attention. As well, in many of the cases in which the
United States is the respondent, the federal government actually "acquiesces"
to a certiorari grant due to the presence of an issue of public importance.49
To evaluate the significance of government parties in certiorari petitions,
we noted the presence of all government parties, both state and federal,
amongst the petitions in our bankruptcy database. In addition, our data
distinguish petitions based upon whether the United States served as petitioner
or respondent.
III. DATABASE CONSTRUCTION
We set out to identify every certiorari petition that raised an issue under
the Bankruptcy Code or related points of statutory or constitutional law. We
chose the Supreme Court's 1978 Term as our starting point because that year
coincided with enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.5" Indeed, no Code cases

2, at 775.
46. See Schnapper, supra note 41, at 1222.
47. Baker, supra note 6, at 623 ("Mhe office's standards are well-known to the
Court. When the Solicitor General tells the Court a case is so important that certiorari
should be granted even without a conflict, the Court listens.").
48. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 14, at 681.
49. Bator, supra note 14, at 681.
50. The current Bankruptcy Code, codified at Title 11 of the UNnTED STATES
CODE, was enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92
Stat. 2549 (1978). Since 1978, there have been numerous amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code, most notably in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333; the Bankruptcy Judges, United States
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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reached the Court until its 1979 Term." As we encountered them, we
systematically omitted cases that raised issues under the Bankruptcy Code's
predecessor-the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
Fortunately, the UnitedStates Law Week provided an easy mechanism to
accomplish our goal. That publication lists all certiorari petitions on the
Supreme Court's paid docket, provides a subject matter summary for each of
these petitions, and indexes the petitions by subject matter. Commencing with
the 1978 Supreme Court term and United States Law Week volume 47, our
inquiry in each volume began in the topical index. This index categorizes all
petitions according to their underlying subject matter under alphabetized
subject matter headings. The "bankruptcy" heading in each volume's index
provided a list, complete with docket numbers, of all certiorari petitions from
the corresponding term involving a bankruptcy case or presenting an issue of
bankruptcy law. Using the docket numbers, we next located each petition in
the "Case Status Report.""2 For each petition, the Case Status Report
included the location of the subject matter summary' within the volume. 4
The subject matter summaries provided many types of information

Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat.
3114 (1986); and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat.
4106 (1994).
The Bankruptcy Code replaced the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. It is conventional
to refer to the current statute as the "Code" and the predecessor statute as the "Act."
51. The first cert petition under the Bankruptcy Code we identified was Williams
v. New York State HigherEducationServices Corporation,449 U.S. 843 (1980). That

case involved the dischargeability of student loans in the interim between repeal of a
previous statute barring their discharge in bankruptcy and enactment of the then-new
Bankruptcy Code. See New York St. Higher Educ. Serv. Corp. v. Adamo (In re
Adamo), 619 F.2d 216 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied,449 U.S. 843 (1980).
52. Numerically by docket number, the Case Status Report lists all certiorari
petitions and appeals filed in the corresponding term as well as those petitions and
appeals "carried over" from the previous term.
53. While the topical index provides brief subject matter "slugs" for each petition,
such description is too superficial to lend meaningful guidance regarding the
substantive issues underlying a petition. Reference to the subject matter summaries
was necessary.
54. Using the information in the Case Status Report, we also excluded three
appeals, eight petitions for a writ of mandamus, and fourteen voluntary dismissals of
certiorari petitions. None of these cases involved a Supreme Court decision on
whether to grant certiorari. We also omitted fourteen petitions in which the Court,
without opinion, summarily reversed or vacated a lower court decision. A summary
reversal or vacatur, without opinion, typically occurs when the Court has just issued
a published opinion raising issues similar to those raised in the certiorari petition.
These summary dispositions do not necessarily reflect the Court's decision that the
petition independently presents particularly "certworthy" issues.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/10
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essential to our database. Most importantly, the summaries described the
substantive question(s) presented by each petition, which we used to identify
the subject-matter of the petition."5 Each subject matter summary also
provided a summary of the lower court's ruling and listed the case name,
originating circuit, and citation for the lower-court opinion. We used the case
name to identify the existence of a governmental party or petitioner as well
as the existence of an institutional creditor party or petitioner. We categorized
petitions by Supreme Court term based on when the Court granted or denied
the petition rather than when the petition was filed.
There were advantages and disadvantages to our heavy reliance on United
States Law Week. Most obviously, we were relying on someone else's
characterization and indexing. Because a certiorari petition raising an issue
of bankruptcy law is readily identified by the petition's reference to any
statutory provision of the Bankruptcy Code, it is unlikely we would have
arrived at a drastically different list of cases had we done the initial indexing
ourselves. We are confident that the bankruptcy subject matter heading in
United States Law Week provided a reliable list of bankruptcy certiorari
petitions. Also, except for the certiorari petitions that were granted and led
to a published opinion, we relied on United States Law Week's short summary
of the case's subject matter instead of reading the lower court's opinion.
Despite these shortcomings, our methodology had important advantages: low
cost and ready accessibility. We did not have the resources available to
duplicate the extensive methodology of previous studies, but our methodology
did allow for a longitudinal study of certiorari in a specific subject area.56

55. We identified twelve different subject matter categories: (i) constitutional law,
(ii) bankruptcy procedure, (iii) composition of the bankruptcy estate/exemptions, (iv)
secured creditor issues, (v) avoiding powers, (vi) bankruptcy tax, (vii) executory
contracts, (viii) bankruptcy discharge and dischargeability, (ix) automatic stay, (x)
eligibility for bankruptcy filing, (xi) chapters 11, 12, and 13 plans, (xii) allowance,
disallowance, and valuation of creditor claims. We also had a miscellaneous category
for cases that did not fit one of the twelve descriptions. In the event the petition raised
issues in more than one subject matter category, we used the issue listed first in the

petition. Our statistical analysis aggregated several of these categories together, as
discussed infra notes 65-89 and accompanying text.
56. For example, Professor Perry in 1991 published a major study ofthe certiorari
process which had begun in the early 1980s. Professor Perry interviewed sixty-four

former Supreme Court law clerks and five Supreme Court justices to provide an indepth examination of the certiorari decisions from the 1976-1980 Terms. See H.W.
PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE 8-11 (1991). Similarly, Professors Estreicher and

Sexton used twenty-two law review editors and 4 research assistants to review 2,061
cert petitions from the Court's 1982 Term. See Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 2, at
707-08. Their result is a study stunning in both its depth and breadth.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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We did not select some certiorari petitions although they might be
characterized as bankruptcy related in a broad sense. First, we omitted any
certiorari petition from a state court decision. It is possible that federal
bankruptcy issues can arise in a state court proceeding. For example, a debtor
might plead a discharge in bankruptcy as a defense to a creditor's state-court
collection suit. Since enactment of the Code, there have been 44 certiorari
petitions from state court proceedings that raised an issue of federal
bankruptcy law. Because the Court did not grant certiorari in any of these
cases and because we were primarily interested in federal bankruptcy cases,
we omitted all of these state-court certiorari petitions from our statistical
analysis. Inclusion of these state-court cases would have skewed our statistical
analysis by making it appear that the Court grants certiorari in federal
bankruptcy cases less often than actually occurs.
Because United States Law Week does not identify petitions off the
Court's informapauperis("IFP") docket,our methodology also did not allow
us to identify IFP bankruptcy cert petitions.17 Criminal matters constitute
most of the IFP docket, meaning few, if any, bankruptcy cases can be found
there.5" Moreover, enactment of the Code, the Court has never granted
certiorari in a bankruptcy case off the IFP docket. Therefore, omission of the
IFP docket should have had little effect on our study.

57. All of the petitions in our sample were paid cases, filed pursuant to Supreme.
Court Rule 33. None of the petitions involved in forma pauperis or "IFP" cases,
which have docket numbers greater than 5001. In an IFP case, the Court allows the
parties to file a petition for cert without paying the docket fee and any other costs
required by the Court. Regarding the distinction between these two types of cases, see
generallySTERN ET AL., supranote 10, § 8.1, at 407. Any comparisons in this article
to overall certiorari trends refer only to the paid certiorari docket.
58. The leading treatise on Supreme Court practice describes the IFP docket
thusly:
The vast majority of these in forma pauperis cases are filed by
impoverished criminal defendants and prisoners, either pro se or by
assigned counsel. While litigants in civil proceedings also may seek to
proceed informapauperisbefore the Court, many on apro se basis, their
numbers are relatively small.
STERN ET AL., supra note 10, § 8.1, at 407.
Moreover, in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), the Supreme Court
ruled that debtors did not have a constitutional right to file an in forma pauperis
petition in federal bankruptcy court. The upshot of the ruling was that one could be
too poor to file for bankruptcy. Just because no constitutionalright to file an IFP
petition exists in the lower-level courts does not mean it is inconceivable that a
bankrupt debtor would file an IFP cert petition. The Kras case, however, certainly
makes such a cert petition much less likely and further justifies the exclusion of IFP
cases from our study.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/10
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Through our methodology, we identified 611 certiorari petitions involving
issues of federal bankruptcy law. The Supreme Court considered and acted
upon these petitions from its 1980 Term through its 1995 Term. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in 43 or 7.0% of these cases, a figure comparable to
the overall rate of 6.0% for certiorari grants in all cases over the same time
period. (Again, these figures only include cases from the Court's paid
docket.)
Compiling data regarding the presence and extent of intercircuit conflicts
underlying these 611 certiorari petitions required reference beyond United
States Law Week, to the court of appeals opinion from which each certiorari
petition originated. 9 A majority of the p~titions in our database, 417
(68.2%), were taken from opinions published in West's FederalReporter.We
also consulted 59 (9.7%) "unpublished" opinions for which a complete text
appeared on Westlaw, a computerized legal research database. There were
135 (22.1%) lower-court opinions that were truly unpublished, appearing
neither in the FederalReporter nor on Westlaw.
We identified a petition as presenting an intercircuit conflict when the
originating circuit court expressly stated its disagreement with the holding of
another circuit court regarding any of the "issues presented" in the petition.'
This approach builds on others' observations that the Court, in its caseselection process, looks for the presence of direct conflicts between lowercourt opinions. For cases that resulted in a published opinion by the Supreme
Court, we used the Court's characterization to identify any possible circuit

59. The UnitedStates Law Week case summaries did mention the presence of a
possible intercircuit conflict in some, but not most, of the instances in which a conflict
actually existed. Thus, for some cases, we were able to verify our identification of an
intercircuit conflict with the claims asserted in the petition for certiorari. To identify
intercircuit conflicts, we did not rely solely on the Law Week case summaries out of
concern that litigants would inflate claims of circuit conflict to improve their chances
of successfully petitioning for certiorari.
For each petition, we limited our search for intercircuit conflicts to the published
opinion or unpublished disposition of the originating federal circuit court. We did not
research the published opinions of the originating bankruptcy court or federal district
court. However, in one instance we identified the presence of an intercircuit conflict
from a dissent from a denial of certiorari. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Jim Heilig Oil &
Gas, Inc., 479 U.S. 966 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60. See Feeney, supranote 15, at 305-06 (defining a direct conflict as a conflict
"in which the decision below deals with the same explicit point as some other case and
reaches a contradictory result"); see also STERN ET AL., supranote 10, § 6.31, at 355
(arguing the Court places importance upon conflicts that are direct, meaning "another
circuit would decide the case differently because of language in an opinion in a case
having substantial factual similarity").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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conflict. 1 We did not attempt to distinguish "degrees" of conflict,62 but we
did disregard instances where a lower court expressed disagreement with a
proposition characterized as the obiter dicta of another decision.63 Once we
recognized the existence of a conflict, we ascertained the number of circuit
courts that had addressed the issue. Our method again relied upon the
originating circuit court's published opinion or unpublished disposition,
counting the number of circuits addressing the issue from the cases cited.
By using court opinions as a measure of circuit conflict, we deliberately
avoided reliance on the brief accompanying a litigant's petition for certiorari.
Because of the Supreme Court's stated standards for granting certiorari,
litigants have an incentive to overstate the existence and depth of a circuit
conflict."
IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

A. The Bankruptcy Explosion at the Supreme Court
Over the last several years, bankruptcy cases have been becoming an
increasingly large portion of the overall federal docket. As Table One,
Column E shows, bankruptcy cases have grown from approximately 55% of
the federal court docket during the Supreme Court's 1983 Term to over 75%

61. One of the authors (Lawless) has closely followed the Supreme Court's
bankruptcy work. See Lawless, Bankruptcy Legisprudence,supra note 32, passim.
Tabb & Lawless, Rehnquist Court, supra note 5, passim. In his experience, the
Supreme Court usually notes the existence of any circuit conflict when deciding
bankruptcy issues.
62. Although other commentators have drawn such distinctions, see, e.g., Alsup
& Salisbury, supranote39, at 364 (noting a distinction between direct conflicts, strong
partial conflicts, and weak partial conflicts); Shenberg, supra note 13, at 1013
(distinguishing between conflicts arising from the application of different legal
standards as opposed to the same legal standard), trying to distinguish between
"degrees" ofconflict would have injected more subjectivity into our data and ultimately
led to less reliable statistical results.
63. See STERN ET AL., supra note 10, § 4.3, at 167 (arguing the Court will not
recognize a true conflict where the lower-court decision conflicts only with the dicta
or reasoning of another decision). When a conflict arises only with reference to the
dicta of a decision, the Supreme Court also may desire further percolation of the issue,
considering the fact that the lower court may reevaluate its position when the issue is
squarely before it. See Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 7, at 723.
64. As discussed infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text, Supreme Court Rule
10 expressly states that a circuit conflict is part of the criteria for deciding whether to
grant cert.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/10

18

and Murray:CERTIORARI
Lawless: Empirical
of Bankruptcy
Certiorari
1997]Lawless
BANKRUPTCY
AN Analysis
EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS
119
by the Court's 1993 Term (the last year for which figures were available).6 5
Figure One graphically demonstrates the sharp rise in bankruptcy petitions
during the mid- and late-1980s. So far, the 1990s have proven to be a
plateau, with bankruptcy petitions levelling off but showing no sign of decline.
Currently, for every civil or criminal case commenced in the United States
district courts, debtors file over three bankruptcy petitions. With bankruptcy
petitions expected to top one million in 1996, these trends should continue.

Number of Cases Commenced in the U.S. Courts, by S. Ct. Term
Figure 1
1000000
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600000
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200000
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Criminal Cases Commenced

aankr. Petitions Filed

65. We chose Supreme Court terms as the temporal unit of measurement for our
study for the sake of consistency with most other statistical presentations of certiorari
information. Each Supreme Court Term runs from approximately July 1 to June 30
of the following year. See STERN Er AL., supranote 10, § 1.2, at 3. We conformed
all of our data to measurements based on Supreme Court terms. For example we used
statistical information about the federal court docket based on a year ending of
June 30.
For information about the general federal court docket, we found reliable
information through the 1993 Term, which ended on June 30, 1994. Our analysis of
bankruptcy certiorari petitions specifically runs through the 1995 Term.
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Number of Cases Commenced in the U.S. Courts, by S. Ct. Term
Table 1'
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)

(A)
S. Ct.

Civil Cases

Criminal Cases

Bankr.

Bankr. Petitions

Tim

Commenced

Commenced

Petitions Filed

as %of Total

1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

168,789
180,756
206,193
241,842
261,485
273,670
254,828
239,185
239,639
235,529
217,879
207,690
226,895
228,562
235,996

28,000
30,400
31,600
34,700
35,900
38,500
35,900
42,200
43,500
44,900
46,500
45,100
47,500
45,700
44,900

277,880
360,329
367,866
374,734
344,725
364,536
477,856
561,278
594,567
642,993
725,484
880,399
927,490
918,374
845,257

58.54%
63.07%
60.74%
57.54%
53.69%
53.87%
62.17%
66.61%
67.74%
69.63%
73.29%
77.69%
77.17%
77.00%
75.06%

As bankruptcy filings have grown, so has the portion of the Supreme
Court's docket devoted to bankruptcy law. During the Bankruptcy Code's
early days (1981-1986), the Supreme Court saw 20 to 30 bankruptcy cert
petitions per year, which accounted for about only 1.0% of the Court's paid
certiorari docket. Since the 1990 Term, however, the number of bankruptcy
cert petitions has grown to between 50 and 60 per year, and they now
comprise approximately 3% of the paid certiorari docket.

% of Cert Petitions Acted Upon and Granted, by S. Ct. Term
Figure 2
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66. The numbers in this table were compiled from various annual editions of the
Department of Commerce's StatisticalAbstractof the UnitedStates. The Statistical
Abstractrounds off the number of new federal criminal prosecutions and civil actions
each year to the nearest hundred.
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Percentage of S. Ct. Docket Attributable to Bankruptcy
Table 267
(A)

(3)

(C)

(D)

(E)

S. Ct.

# of Cert.

# of

%

# of Bankr.

(F)
# of
Bankr.

(G)

(H)
Bankr.
Petitions/

(1)
Bankr.
Grants/

Tenn

Petitions

Grant

Granted

Petitions

Grant

%Granted

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

2,324
2,513
2,297
2,220
2,253
2,185
2,189
2,224
2,271
2,096
2,042
2,125
2,140
2,099
2,185

167
203
169
140
167
166
152
157
130
103
114
103
83
78
83

7.2%
8.1%
7.4%
6.3%
7.4%
7.6%
6.9%
7.1%
5.7%
4.9%
5.6%
4.9%
3.9%
3.7%
3.8%

8
30
23
25
32
17
29
35
45
41
60
55
50
63
48

0
3
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
5
9
S
3
1
3

0.0%
10.0%
8.7%
4.0%
6.3%
5.9%
6.9%
5.7%
4.4%
12.2%
15.0%
9.1%
6.0%
1.6%
6.3%

0.3%
1.2%
1.0%
1.1%
1.4%
0.8%
1.3%
1.6%
2.0%
2.0%
2.9%
2.6%
2.3%
3.0%
2.2%

0.0%
1.5%
1.2%
0.7%
1.2%
0.6%
1.3%
1.3%
1.5%
4.9%
7.9%
4.9%
3.6%
1.3%
3.6%

1995

2,130

92

4.3%

50

2

4.0%

2.4%

2.2%

All Years

35,293

2,107

6.0%

611

43

7.0%

1.7%

2.0%

AllPetitions AllGrants

Even more striking has been the Court's increasing acceptance rate for
bankruptcy cert petitions. Many commentators noted the Court's early 1990s
explosion of interest in bankruptcy law. The 1990 Term was the high-water
mark, where the Court granted cert in 9 or 15% of the bankruptcy cases
presented to it. Bankruptcy accounted for 7.9% of all the Court's certiorari
grants. The statistics for the 1989 and 1991 Terms, while not as dramatic,
also show a dramatic increase in the Court's interest in federal bankruptcy
law.

67. As explained in the methodology, the total number of certiorari petitions was
based on the paid docket only. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. IFP
cases were excluded. The overall certiorari figures were culled from various volumes
of UnitedStatesLaw Week by reference to that publication's annual "Statistical Recap
of Supreme Court's Workload During Last Three Term." This table typically appears
in UnitedStates Law Week during August and reports statistics for the Supreme Court
term that has just ended.
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% of Docket Attributable to Bankruptcy
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It is plausible that the Court's "bankruptcy explosion" did nothing more
than reflect bankruptcy's growing importance in the federal docket overall.
Figure Three and the numbers from Tables One and Two suggest, however,
that the Court was acting even beyond the statistical trend. Figure Three
graphically overlays the trends in the general federal docket and the Supreme
Court's docket. The top line, which is represented on the right-hand Y-axis,
charts the increase in bankruptcy petitions in the total federal docket. The
bottom two lines, which are represented on the left-hand Y-axis, track
bankruptcy cert petitions as a percentage of the Court's certiorari docket and
bankruptcy cert grants as a percentage of the Court's total number of grants.
The Court's interest notably spiked in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Although the graphical representation smoothes out the top trend line, this
spike is out of proportion to both the increase of bankruptcy cases in the total
federal docket and the increase of bankruptcy cases in the certiorari docket.
Thus, it is fair to say that the Court did take an increased interest in
bankruptcy cases during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The numbers,
however, cannot provide the reason for the Court's increased interest. The
answer to that question must be found through more sensitive analysis. It is
likely that, as the Bankruptcy Code matured from its 1978 enactment to the
late 1980s, many bankruptcy issues surfaced in the lower courts that
eventually demanded the Court's attention. If this supposition is correct, it
supports a percolation hypothesis.
B. Determinantsof Bankruptcy Certiorari
Even more than the Court's level of interest in bankruptcy law, statistical
analysis identifies important trends in the bankruptcy cases the Court is
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/10

22

Lawless and Murray: Lawless: Empirical Analysis of Bankruptcy Certiorari

1997]

BANKRUPTCY CERTIORARI- AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

123

inclined to hear. These trends favor governmental parties and institutional
creditors (e.g., banks, finance companies, insurance companies). These
litigants are most likely to have their appeals heard by the Supreme Court.
For sake of comparison with the material presented in this subpart, remember
that the Court grants certiorari an average of 7.0% of the time in bankruptcy
cases and an average of 6.0% in all cases.
Identifying the motives and factors behind the Supreme Court's certiorari
decision making process is an inherently problematic endeavor. For certiorari
petitioners looking for a bright-line rule of guidance, the Court provides only
its own rule 10.6' To appreciate the ambiguity underlying the Court's
decision making process, one need look no further than rule 10's statement
that "certiorari will be granted only when there are special and important
reasons therefor."'69 Moreover, Rule 10 carefully qualifies its own list of
certiorari criteria, which focus primarily on the existence of conflict among the
lower courts.7" The Court's own decisions also provide little guidance,
adhering to a traditional practice of omitting the Court's reasons for granting
or denying certiorari to a particular petition.7 '

68. SuP. CT. R. 10; see STERN Er AL., supranote 10, § 4.2, at 167 (discussing
the bar's criticisms of the failure of Rule 10 to establish more precise guidelines of
"certworthiness" for petitioners).
69. Su. CT. R. 10.
70. Rule 10 provides a list "[indicating] the character of reasons that will be
considered," which include: (1) United States court of appeals decisions in conflict
with the decision of another court of appeals or state court supreme court, (2) state
supreme court decisions deciding a federal question differently than another state
supreme court or federal court of appeals, and (3) federal court of appeals decisions
that conflict with Supreme Court precedent or present important questions of federal
law.
Even this list is deemed noncontrofling. A disclaimer comes immediately prior
to the list of criteria, stating the list is "neither controlling nor fully [a measure of] the
Court's discretion." Rule 10 and its predecessor forms reflect the Court's own
reluctance to reduce the certiorari decision making process to a set of neat guidelines,
embodying the view that "[fjrequently the question whether a case is 'certworthy' is
more a matter of 'feel' than of precisely ascertainable rules." John M. Harlan,
Manning the Dikes, 13 RECORD OF N.Y.C. BAR AssN. 541, 548-49 (1959); see also
William J.Brennan, The NationalCourt ofAppeals: Another Dissent,40 U. CHI.
L. REV. 473, 478-79 (1973); Earl Warren, The National Court of Appeals, 59
A.B.A. J.721, 727-28 (1973).
71. See STERN ET AL., supra note 10, § 5.5, at 234. When the Court does state
its reasons for granting certiorari, the explanation most often comes in superficial form.
STERN ET AL., supranote 10, § 4.2, at 167.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

23

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 10

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

Characteristics of Bankruptcy Cert Petitions
Table 3
(A)

Circuit Split
Unpub. Lower Ct. Opinion

(B)
Number of
Bankr.
Petitions w/
Charaeteristie
97
194

(C)

(E)

19.9%
31.7%

(D)
Number of
Bankr. Cert
Grants w/
Characteristic
26
2

Grants As % or
Column (R)
27A%
1.1%

As % of All
Bankr. Cert

No Gov't Party
Fed. Gov. Pet.
Fed. Gov. Res.
State Gov. Pet.
State Gov. Res.

447
13
107
26
18

73.2%
2.1%
17.5%
4.2%
2.9%

24
11
2
5
1

5.4%
84.6%
1.9%
19.2%
5.6%

No Instl. Party
Instl. Pet.
Instl. Res.

505
31
75

82.3%
5.1%
12.3%

33
6
2

6.5%
19.4%
0.5%

Certiorari as a Function of Number of Circuits
in Conflict with Lower Court Decision
Table 47
(A)
Number of
Circuits in
Conflict
Zero
One
Two
Three
Four

Five
Six or More

(3)
Number of
Bankr. Cert
391
33
19
21
10
8
6

(C)

As % of All
Bankr. Cert
P~etitions
80.1%
6.8%
3.9%
4.3%
2.0%
1.6%
1.2%

(D)
Number of
Bankr. Cert
Grants
17
7
4
7
2
2
4

(E)
Grants As % of
Column IB)
4.3%
21.2%
21.1%
33.3%
20.0%
25.0%
66.7%

72. Column A could benefit from clarification. Column A identifies the number
of circuits in conflict with the circuit under review. For example, if the circuit opinion
in question said it conflicted with the decision of two other circuit courts, then the
value in Column A is "2."
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Table Three presents a number of characteristics and explains their
influence on the certiorari process. Not surprisingly, the Court granted
certiorari in 27.4% of the cases where the lower court opinion was in conflict
with at least one other circuit. Circuit conflicts are one of the Court's stated
criteria for granting certiorari. Moreover, Table Four shows that, as the
number of circuits in conflict goes up, the likelihood of a cert grant goes up
as well, reaching a high of 66.7% for the six cases that conflicted with the
rulings in six other circuits.
Also not a big surprise is the small number of cases where the Court
grants certiorari from an unpublished opinion of the circuit court. The Court
granted cert in only 1.1% of these cases, compared with a 7.0% grant rate
overall. For an unpublished opinion, the lower court is supposed to have
made a determination that the case was unimportant or unlikely to lead to a
useful precedent of widespread application.73 Because an important criteria
for cert is whether the case has national importance, 4 an unpublished circuit
court opinion may signal the Supreme Court that the case has little
significance. Whether this signal is justified is another question, beyond the
scope of this paper.75
Table Three's most important revelation is the Court's favored litigants.
Governmental or institutional litigants are much more likely than other
litigants to have their cases heard by the Supreme Court. Most astonishingly,
the Court has agreed to hear 11 of 13 (84.6%) of the federal government's
bankruptcy cert petitions. This figure is higher than the 70% success rate for
the Solicitor General in all cases.7
As discussed earlier, the Solicitor
General (sometimes referred to as the "Tenth Justice") performs a screening
function for the Court traditionally making it more likely federal appeals will
be heard in the Supreme Court.77
The Court, however, also has looked favorably upon state governmental
petitions78 and the certiorari petitions of institutional creditors.79 For these
73. See Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals PerishIf They
Publish? or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial
Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 757, 759 n.7, 789-90 (1995)
(explaining why the courts of appeals issue unpublished decisions).
74. See PERRY, supranote 56, at 253-60.
75. See Dragich, supra note 73, passim (criticizing the trend of the courts of
appeals to issue fewer published decisions).
76. See supra note 41 (citing to empirical studies of Solicitor General cert
petitions).
77. See supra Part II.B.1.
78. In this paper, "state governments" include local subunits of a state government
such as a municipality.
79. For purposes of this paper, we defined "institutional creditors" as banks,
insurance companies, finance companies, and similar institutions that regularly extend
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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petitions, the Court has granted certiorari, respectively, 19.2% and 19.4% of
the time. Regardless of the respondent's identity, nongovernmental and
noninstitutional petitioners have had average to below average success in
having the Court hear their bankruptcy appeals. Although the mediating
influence of the Solicitor General perhaps can explain the favorable reception
of federal cert petitions, it is difficult, if not impossible, to advance a similarly
neutral explanation for why the Court has so favorably received the petitions
of state governments and financial institutions.8"
Moreover, once the Court has granted certiorari, it has favored
governmental and institutional litigants at the expense of unsecured creditors
and debtors." By definition, a cert petition means the litigant lost at the
circuit court level. Governmental and institutional litigants have had an easier
time getting the Supreme Court to reverse adverse lower court decisions. The
trend is perverse. These litigants are most likely to have the resources and
organizational strength to lobby Congress for changes in the federal
bankruptcy statute. The Supreme Court now has opened its doors to their
claims as well. At the highest levels of the federal government, no one
appears to be protecting the interests of the unsecured creditor or the
debtor.8 2

credit as part of their business. These institutions usually are repeat players in
bankruptcy litigation throughout the country. A winning appeal financially benefits
an institutional creditor not only by the rendering a favorable judgment in the case
actually on appeal but also by establishing ajudicial precedent the institutional creditor
can use in other cases.
80. Perhaps one could argue that cert petitions from nongovernmental or
noninstitutional litigants are less meritorious. Absent an explanation of why this
should be so on a systematic basis, this argument does not advance a neutral position.
81. See Lawless, Bankruptcy Legisprudence,supra note 32, at 114-16.

82. An argument could be made that the observations in the text explain why
bankruptcy courts are often perceived as "pro-debtor." If the upper levels of the
bankruptcy system are skewed against debtor interests, then a fair-minded bankruptcy
judge might compensate by protecting debtor interests at the lower-court level.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/10
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Certiorari as a Function of Originating Circuit
Table 5 n
(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

(E)

Number of

Bankr. Cert

As % of All

Number of

Petitions from

Bankr. Cert
Petitions

Bankr. Cert
Grants from

First Circuit

15

2.5%

2

13.3%

Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
D.C. Circuit
Federal Circuit

50
57
51
96
53
43
39
101
44
50
10
2

8.2%
9.3%
8.3%
15.7%
8.7%
7.1%
6.4%
16.5%
7.2%
8.2%
1.6%
0.0%

5
5
2
4
6
2
4
3
7
3
0
0

10.0%
8.8%
3.9%
4.2%
11.3%
4.7%
10.3%
3.0%
15.9%
6.0%
0.0%
0.0%

Originating
CircuitCircuit

Grants As % of
Column (B)

Ciruit

Another possibility explanation of certiorari is the originating circuit.
Perhaps some circuits have a reputation for making "bad" bankruptcy law, and
the Court is more likely to hear appeals from these circuits." Table Five
explores this possibility. First Table Five reveals that some circuits contribute
a relatively large percentage of Supreme Court cert petitions. Because of their
size, both the Fifth and Ninth Circuit generate approximately more than twice
the number of cert petitions than most of the other circuits. Some circuits,
such as the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits do have a larger number of

83. Although the Federal Circuit does not have any direct appellate jurisdiction
over matters that might arise in a federal bankruptcy court, we did identify two cases
from the Federal Circuit that raised bankruptcy issues. These cases both involved the
relationship between the federal laws protecting intellectual property and the federal
Bankruptcy Code.
84. Theoretically, the Supreme Court's role in the cert process is to identify cases
of national importance. The correctness of the lower court decision generally should
not be an issue. Nevertheless, PERRY, supra note 56, at 265-68, found that, in the
certiorari process, individual justices often place great weight on whether they perceive
that the circuit court "got it right." Professor Perry couches the inquiry as the justices'
sense of how "egregious" the lower court decision was. PERRY, supranote 56, at 26568.
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certiorari grants than other circuits. These differences were not found to be
statistically significant when subjected to the regression analyses discussed
below.

Certiorarias a Function of Subject Matter
Table 6
(A)

Subject Matter
Constitutional Law
Bankruptcy Procedure
Property of the Estate
Secured Creditor Issues
Avoiding Powers
Tax Issues

Executory Contracts
Discharge/Dischargeability
Automatic Stay
Eligibility for Filing
Reorganization Plans
Claim/Valuation
Miscellaneous

(B)
Number of
Bankr. Cert
Petitions w/
Subject
Matter
31
158
63
49
46
21
21
54
37
14
31
24
62

(C)
As % of All
Bankr. Cert

Petitions
5.1%
25.9%

10.3%
8.0%
7.5%
3.4%
3.4%
8.8%
6.1%

2.3%
5.1%
3.9%
10.1%

(E)

(D)
Number of
Banrk. Cert
Grants w/
Subject Matter

Grants As % of
Column (11)

5
6
6
6
4
4
1
4
2
2
1
2
0

16.1%
3.8%
9.5%
12.2%
8.6%
19.0%
4.8%
7.4%
5.4%
14.2%
3.2%
8.3%
0.0%

Another possible determinant of bankruptcy certiorari is the subject
matter of the cert petition. It could be that the Court deems certain
bankruptcy issues of more importance and therefore more "certworthy." We
identified twelve different subject matters along with a residual miscellaneous
category. We then categorized each cert petition based on the subject matter
description in UnitedStates Law Week. Our primary goal in categorizing the
cases was consistency, so that the same issue received the same category
assignment whether it was presented in the first or the last case examined.
Bankruptcy procedure far and away presented the largest number of
cases. These cases tended to be appeals from obstreperous or desperate
litigants. Examples included petitions to have a lower-court judge recused
because of conflict of interest or an argument that the lower court had
deprived the litigant of due process of law. These cases had a low (3.8%)
acceptance rate.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/10
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Several subject matters exhibited high acceptance rates. Constitutional
law issues (16.1%), secured creditor issues (12.2%), and tax issues (19.0%)
all had acceptance rates above ten percent. 5 These issues also tend to be
raised by governmental and institutional litigants, and the Court's proclivity
to accept cert petitions from these groups might explain the higher acceptance
rate. Issues relating to the eligibility to file bankruptcy had a 14.2%
acceptance rate. Only 14 of the 611 (2.3%) petitions presented eligibility
issues, meaning that the relative acceptance rate for these cases was extremely
sensitive to small changes in the absolute number of certiorari grants (i.e., one
less cert grant "would have cut the acceptance rate in half, to 7.2%). When
subjected to regression analysis, only constitutional law cases were found to
have a statistically significant effect on the Court's decision to grant certiorari.
Table Seven presents the results of a logistic regression analysis on our
data.86 A logistic regression measures the effects of independent variables
on the logarithm of the odds on a positive response. Thus, one cannot
interpret the results in a logistic regression as estimating the statistical
likelihood of a particular event. To do so requires a mathematical
calculation.87 Although the logarithmic transformation may seem arcane and
unnecessarily complex, it is used quite often and has several useful qualities.88
85. One might argue that the Supreme Court accepts more cert petitions from
governmental and institutional litigants because their cert petitions present more
important issues. The existence of important issues, however, should be equally as
likely whether a governmental or institutional litigant is the petitioner or the
respondent. Our statistical analysis showed that the Court accepts more cert petitions
only when the government or institutional litigant is the petitioner.
86. We also performed two other logistic regression analyses, not discussed in the
text. We did a regression analysis based on the originating circuit for the cert petition
and found no statistically significant relationships. We also performed a regression
analysis based on the subject matter of the cert petition and found a statistically
significant relationship only for constitutional law issues. Rather than burden a legal
journal with tables of numbers that have no story to tell, we have omitted these
regressions from our discussion.
87. To elaborate on the points in the text, assume thatp represents the probability
of a positive response on an underlying event. In our case, the underlying event is the
decision whether to grant certiorari. Logistic regression produces a "log-odds," which
is the logarithm of the ratio of the probability of a positive response to the probability
of a negative response. Mathematically, a logistic regression estimates L = logp/Il-p].
To transform L into the probability of a positive response (p), perform the following
calculation: p = 1/(1 + e'L). For further discussion, see MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN
& BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS § 12.34 (1990).

88. Specifically, a logarithmic transformation allows measurement of nonlinear
effects on the event to be measured. Normal linear models of regression are not
appropriate to measure a predicted outcome, such as the decision to grant cert, because
these linear models allow the predicted outcome probability to fall outside the range
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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Those without a strong mathematical background need not be intimidated
by the regression analysis. The regression does nothing more than measure
the quality and strength of the relationship between various case characteristics
and the probability the Court will grant certiorari. (In an attempt at simplicity,
Table 8 presents these relationships using the more readily understood concept
of probability.) If a characteristic is found to have statistical significance, we
can say with a high level of confidence that the characteristic is related to the
likelihood the Court will grant certiorari. On the other hand, the lack of
statistical significance does not necessarily mean the characteristic has no
effect on the Court's decision to grant certiorari. Statistical significance may
be lacking due to any number of reasons, including misspecification of the
regression model or data collection errors.
In the table, INTERCEPT is the intercept estimate for the equation, i.e.,
the value of the equation when all independent variables equal zero.
SPLITNUM is the number of circuits in conflict with the decision under
review, and UNPUB indicates an unpublished circuit decision. INSPET,
FEDPET, and STPET indicate the presence of an institutional, federal, or state
petitioner respectively. In addition to these variables, we tested for the
presence of constitutional law issues because these cases with a constitutional
law issue are widely believed to be more "certworthy." In the table,
CONLAW indicates the case involved an issue of constitutional law.
Statistical significance is indicated by *** for significance at the 99% level,
by ** for significance a the 95% level, and by * for significance at the 90%
level.

from 0 to 1. See FINKELSTEIN &LEIN, supranote 87, § 12.34. Alogistic regression
forces the range of predicted outcomes to fall between 0 and 1. Also, a logistic
regression accounts for skewness in the distribution of the data. FINKELSTEIN &
LEVIN, supra note 87, § 12.34.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/10
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Logistic Regression Analysis
Table 7
sample size (N) =488 (123 observations were omitted due to missing values)
model overall Chi-square score = 151.056***; -2 Log likelihood score = 93.420***
at 50% probability level, false positives = 36.4% & false negatives = 6.2%
concordance = 85.3%

INTERCEPT
SPLITNUM
UNPUB
INSPET
FEDPET
STPET
CONLAW

Parameter
Estimate

Wald
Chi-Square

Standard
Error

-3.0541***

135.6721
33.8333
1.8183
8.1345
29.9893
5.8631
3.3696

0.0957
0.8486
0.5428
0.8307
0.5950
0.6651

0.5569***
-1.1442
!.5482***
4.5489***
1.4406**
1.2209*

0.3008

---------------------------------------------------------

Probability of Cert Grant for Bankruptcy Cases
Table 8
Factors Present
(1)
SPLITNUM
INSPET
FEDPET
STPET
CONLAW
Probability of
Cert Grant

(2)
1

(3)
i

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)
I

X

2.9%

15.1%

5.0%

9.3%

12.4%

74.0%

11.3% 83.2%

(9)
1
X

19.8%

94.4%

Overall, the model explains a large portion of the reasons the Court
grants cert in a bankruptcy case. The test scores for the overall model
demonstrate statistical significance for the entire model. Moreover, the
independent variables show high levels of statistical significance. Only the
presence of an unpublished lower court opinion was found not to be
statistically significant.
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Thus, the results indicate a statistically significant relationship between
the identity of the petitioner and certiorari acceptance rate. Specifically,
governmental and institutional litigants have statistically significant higher
acceptance rates than other litigants. Also, the regression shows that an
increase in the number of circuits split on the issue increased the likelihood
that the Court would accept the case. This last finding is consistent with the
hypothesis that the Court will allow some issues to percolate in the lower
courts before accepting a case and issuing a decision of binding national
effect.
Table 8 puts the regression analysis in more understandable terms by
performing a mathematical transformation of the regression results to produce
probabilities. 9 We performed the calculation for selected combinations of
case characteristics. Thus, as Column (1) shows, a case without any of the
characteristics in Table 8 has only a 2.9% chance of being granted certiorari.
In contrast, Column (10) calculates a 94.4% probability of a cert grant for a
circuit court opinion involving constitutional law with at least one circuit in
conflict and brought to the Supreme Court by the federal government. The
federal government's status as petitioner alone raises the probability of a cert
grant to 74.0% (Column 5). If an institutional creditor presents a cert petition,
the chance of a cert grant is 12.4% (Column 4), while the same petition
presented by a state government stands a 11.3% (Column 6) chance of being
granted cert. The presence of a circuit split raises the probability of certiorari
only 5.0% (Column 3).
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have admittedly presented a great deal of information and figures in
a short space. The analysis has a number of important implications for those
interested in bankruptcy or the Supreme Court generally. To summarize our
major findings:
*Currently, the Supreme Court receives approximately 50 to 60
bankruptcy.certiorari petitions per year, granting cert in an average of
7.0% of these cases and hearing an average of 3 or 4 bankruptcy cases
per year. These figures are comparable to the certiorari grant rate for all
cases of 6.0%.
-In bankruptcy cases, the certiorari process has favored governmental and
institutional litigants. The statistical result is extremely robust and
significant when subjected to regression analysis. For state governments
and institutional litigants, no satisfactory, neutral explanation can be

89. The mathematical transformation is the calculation on the log-odds ratio that
produces a probability for the event in question, as discussed supranote 87.
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offered for this apparent bias. These results were consistent with other
scholarship that demonstrated the increased likelihood of a governmental
petitioner being granted cert. The finding for institutional litigants is
new. We were not able to duplicate results showing that the presence of
a governmental respondentmade certiorari more likely.
-The existence and depth of a circuit conflict is important when the Court
decides whether to grant cert in a bankruptcy case. This finding is
consistent with classic legal explanations of the certiorari process.
Moreover, because the Court is more likely to hear a bankruptcy case the
greater the number of circuits involved in the split, our findings are
consistent with the theory that the Court will allow some issues to
"percolate" in the lower courts before agreeing to decide them.
-Several subject matters--constitutional law, secured creditor issues, and
tax issues--exhibited cert acceptance rates far above the 7.0% average.
Our regression analysis showed only constitutional law to have a
statistically significant effect.
-In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Supreme Court did agree to hear
a large number of bankruptcy cases, out of proportion to bankruptcy's
share of the overall federal docket. Our statistics were incapable of
capturing the reasons for this increased interest, which probably is best
explained by more subjective analysis. Perhaps a number of the justices
simply had a personal interest in the bankruptcy issues presented to the
Court.90 Given the background of the current justices, it is somewhat
unlikely that any of them have a personal interest in bankruptcy law.A
more plausible analysis rests in the Bankruptcy Code's development.
After the Bankruptcy Code was enacted, the Supreme Court was called
upon to hear a small number of important structural issues (e.g., the
Code's retroactivity, the constitutionality of the bankruptcy court system).
After these few important structural cases were decided, it took a few
years for the Code to mature and for important statutory issues to
percolate through the lower courts (e.g., the scope of the chapter 13
cramdown, the relationship between fraudulent transfers and real-estate
foreclosures). By the late 1980s, these statutory issues had reached a
point where the Court had to decide them. Thus, the explosion of
bankruptcy cases during the late 1980s and early 1990s can be interpreted
as consistent with the view that the Court allows issues to percolate in the
lower federal courts before hearing them on certiorari.

90. It has been noted that justices often vote to grant cert in areas of law in which
they have a personal interest. See PERRY, supra note 56, at 260-65 (noting how a
justice from the western United States might be interested in water rights cases or a
justice with a prior corporate practice might be interested in securities law).
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-Bankruptcy cases are similar to the Court's public-law agenda. The
Court uses extra-legal factors in deciding whether to grant certiorari in
bankrupt just as other scholars have identified for public-law cert
petitions. Supreme Court scholars who neglect the Court's agenda in
areas of private law, like bankruptcy, are missing a major piece of the
picture.
The results present a picture of bankruptcy certiorari that differs little
from the picture painted about the certiorari process generally. This suggests
the Court approaches bankruptcy cases in more or less the manner as it
approaches any federal law issue. Our study shows that circuit splits and
percolation are important for bankruptcy law, as they for any other federal
law.
The apparent favoritism for governmental units and financial institutions
is troubling. Many bankruptcy scholars and practitioners forget that the Court
can have as great a role in shaping the bankruptcy statute as Congress. Ron
Pair, Nobelman, and BFP are all examples of Supreme Court decisions
addressing important issues of bankruptcy law that Congress has left
untouched.9 Although most people envision the legislative process as
inherently political and non-neutral, the paradigm for the judiciary is exactly
the opposite. Courts are supposed to act in a neutral fashion, without the bias
that our analysis indicates may be present.
Our results are significant for anyone pondering the future of federal
bankruptcy law. There is no reason the bankruptcy system has to remain static.
Perhaps a mediating agency, much like the SEC's relationship with federal
securities law, would be appropriate for bankruptcy law. Perhaps a specialized
national bankruptcy court of appeals would produce better results. We do not
mean to be heard arguing for such radical reforms, at least not yet. These
reforms carry costs of their own, and frankly, we are not sure whether they
would be an improvement over the existing structure. The debate needs to
occur, however, and the data in this article provide a place to start.

91. These three cases should be familiar to anyone with a background in
bankruptcy law. United States v. Ron PairEnterprises,Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989),
held that an oversecured, nonconsensual lien holder (e.g., a tax lien holder) was
entitled to postpetition interest on its claim. In Nobelman v. AmericanSavings Bank,
508 U.S. 324 (1993), the Supreme Court ruled that a chapter 13 consumer debtor had
to pay her mortgage holder the full value of the holder's claim regardless of the value
of the underlying collateral. In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation,114 S. Ct. 1757
(1994), the Court ruled that a state real estate foreclosure sale was protected from
fraudulent transfer attack under the Bankruptcy Code.
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